The True Clash of Civilizations

Samuel Huntington was o n b halfright. The cultural fault line that divides the West and the Muslim world is not about dernocrag but sex. According to a new survey, Muslims and their Western counterparts want dernocrag, y e t they are worlds apart when it comes to attitudes toward divorce, abortion, gender equalip, andgcy rights-which rncy not bode well for democray's future in the Middle East. I By Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris
emocracy promotion in Islamic countries is now one of the Bush administration's most popular talking points. "We reject the condescending notion that freedom will not grow in the Middle East," Secretary of State Colin Powell declared last December as he unveiled the White House's new Middle East Partnership Initiative to encourage political and economic reform in Arab countries. Likewise, Condoleezza Rice, President George W. Bush's national security advisor, promised last September that the United States is committed to "the march of freedom in the Muslim world."
But does the Muslim world march to the beat of a different drummer? Despite Bush's optimistic pronouncement that there is "no clash of civilizations" when it comes to "the common rights and needs of men and women," others are not so sure. Samuel Huntington's controversial 1993 thesis-that the cultural division between "Western Christianity" and "Orthodox Christianity and Islam" is the new fault line for conflict-resonates more loudly than ever since September 11.Echoing Huntington, columnist Polly Toynbee argued in the British Guardian last November, "What binds together a globalized force of some extremists from many continents is a united hatred of Western values that seems to them to spring from Judeo-Christianity." Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, Democratic Rep. Christopher Shays of Connecticut, after sitting through hours of testimony on U.S.-Islamic relations on Capitol Hill last October, testily blurted, "Why doesn't democracy grab hold in the Middle East? What is there about the culture and the people and so on where democracy just doesn't seem to be something they strive for and work for?"
Huntington's response would be that the Muslim world lacks the core political values that gave birth to representative democracy in Western civilization: separation of religious and secular authority, rule of law and social pluralism, parliamentary institutions of representative government, and protection of individual rights and civil liberties as the buffer between citizens and the power of the state. This claim seems all too plausible given the failure of electoral democracy to take root throughout the Middle East and North Africa. According to the latest Freedom House rankings, almost two thirds of the 192 countries around the world are now electoral democracies. But among the 47 countrieswith a Muslim majority, only one fourth are electoraldemocracies-and none of the core Arabic-speaking societiesfalls into this category.
Yet This gap in values mirrors the widening economic divide between the West and the Muslim world. Commenting on the disenfranchisement of women throughout the Middle East, the United Nations Development Programme observed last summer that "no society can achieve the desired state of well-being and human development, or compete in a globalizing world, if half its people remain marginalized and disempowered." But this "sexual clash of civilizations" taps into far deeper issues than how Muslim countries treat women. A society's commitment to gender equality and sexual liberalization proves time and again to be the most reliable indicator of how strongly that society supports principles of tolerance and egalitarianism. Thus, the people of the Muslim world ovenvhelrmngly want democracy, but democracy may not be sustainable in their societies.
TESTING HUNTINGTON
Huntington argues that "ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, [and] ic and political development, support for democratic institutions is just as strong itage, but which also lived under Communist rule), 11 among those living in Muslim societies as in Western societies with a Muslim majority (Albania, Algeria, (or other) societies [see chart on page 641. For instance, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, a solid majority of people living in Western and MusMorocco, Pakistan, and Turkey), 12 traditionally lim countries gives democracy high marks as the most Orthodox societies (such as Russia and Greece), 11 efficient form of government, with 68 percent dispredominately Catholic Latin American countries, 4 agreeing with assertions that "democracies are indeEast Asian societies shaped by Sino-Confucian values, cisive" and "democracies aren't good at maintaining 5 sub-Saharan Africa countries, plus Japan and India. order." (All other cultural regions and countries, except Despite Huntington's claim of a clash of civiliza-East Asia and Japan, are far more critical.) And an tions between the West and the rest, the wvs reveals equal number of respondents on both sides of the civthat, at this point in history, democracy has an over-ilizational divide (61 percent) firmly reject authoritarian whelmingly positive image throughout the world. In governance, expressing disapproval of "strong leaders" country after country, a clear majority of the popula-who do not "bother with parliament and elections." tion describes "having a democratic political system" Muslim societies display greater support for religious as either "good" or "very good." These results repre-authorities playing an active societal role than do sent a dramatic change from the 1930s and 1940s, Western societies. Yet this preference for religious when fascist regimes won overwhelming mass authorities is less a cultural division between the West approval in many societies; and for many decades, and Islam than it is a gap between the West and many Communist regimes had widespread support. However, when it comes to attitudes toward gender equality and sexual liberalization, the cultural gap between Islam and the West widens into a chasm. On the matter of equal rights and opportunities for women-measured by such questions as whether men make better political leaders than women or whether university education is more important for boys than for girls-Western and Muslim countries score 82 percent and 55 percent, respectively. Muslim societies are also distinctively less permissive toward homosexuality, abortion, and divorce.
S T R O N G LEADERS
These issues are part of a broader syndrome of tolerance, trust, political activism, and emphasis on individual autonomy that constitutes "selfexpression values." The extent to which a society emphasizes these self-expression values has a surprisingly strong bearing on the emergence and survival of democratic institutions. Among all the countries included in the wvs, support for gender equality-a key indicator of tolerance and personal freedom-is closely linked with a society's level of democracy [see chart below].
In every stable democracy, a majority of the public disagrees with the statement that "men make better political leaders than women." None of the societies in which less than 30 percent of the public rejects this statement (such as Jordan, Nigeria, and Belarus) is a true democracy. In China, one of the world's least democratic countries, a majority of the public agrees that men make better political leaders than women, despite a party line that has long emphasized gender equality (Mao Zedong once declared, "women hold up half the sky"). In practice, Chinese women occupy few positions of real power and face widespread discrimination in the workplace. India is a borderline case. The country is a long-standing parliamentary democracy with an independent judiciary and civilian control of the armed forces, yet it is also marred by a weak rule of law, arbitrary arrests, and extrajudicial killings. The status of Indian women reflects this duality. Women's rights are guaranteed in the constitution, and Indira Gandhi led the nation for 15 years. Yet domestic violence and forced prostitution remain prevalent throughout the country, and, according to the wvs, almost 50 percent of the Indian populace believes only men should run the government.
The way a society views homosexuality constitutes another good litmus test of its commitment to equality. Tolerance of well-liked groups is never a problem. But if someone wants to gauge how tolerant a nation really is, find out which group is the most disliked, and then ask whether members of that group should be allowed to hold public meetings, teach in schools, and work in government. Today, relatively few people express overt hostility toward other classes, races, or religions, but rejection of homosexuals is widespread. In response to a wvs question about whether homosexuality is justifiable, about half of the world's population say "never." But, as is the case with gender equality, this attitude is directly proportional to a country's level of democracy. Among authoritarian and quasi-democratic states, rejection of homosexuality is deeply entrenched: 99 percent in both Egypt and Bangladesh, 94 percent in Iran, 92 percent in China, and 71 percent in India. By contrast, these figures are much lower among respondents in stable democracies: 32 percent in the United States, 26 percent in Canada, 25 percent in Britain, and 19 percent in Germany.
Muslim societies are neither uniquely nor monolithically low on tolerance toward sexual orientation and gender equality. Many of the Soviet successor states rank as low as most Muslim societies. However, on the whole, Muslim countries not only lag behind the West but behind all other societies as well [see chart on opposite page]. Perhaps more significant, the figures reveal the gap between the West and Islam is even wider among younger age groups. This pattern suggests that the younger generations in Western societies have become progressively more egalitarian than their elders, but the younger generations in Muslim societies have remained almost as traditional as their parents and grandparents, producing an expanding cultural gap.
CLASH OF C O N C L U S I O N S
"The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation," President Bush declared in a commencement speech at West Point last summer. He's right. Any claim of a "clash of civilizations" based on fundamentally different political goals held by Western and Muslim societies represents an oversimplification of the evidence. Support for the goal of democracy is surprisingly widespread among Muslim publics, even among those living in authoritarian societies. Yet Huntington is correct when he argues that cultural differences have taken on a new importance, forming the fault lines for future conflict. Although -nearly the entire world pays lip service to democracy, there is still no global consensus on the selfexpression values-such as social tolerance, gender equality, freedom of speech, and interpersonal trust-that are crucial to democracy. Today, these divergent values constitute the real clash between Muslim societies and the West.
But economic development generates changed attitudes in virtually any society. In particular, modernization compels systematic, predictable changes in gender roles: Industrialization brings women into the paid work force and dramatically reduces fertility rates. Women become literate and begin to participate in representative government but still have far less power than men. Then, the postindustrial phase brings a shift toward greater gender equality as women move into higher-status economic roles in management and gain political influence within elected and appointed bodies. Thus, relatively industrialized Muslim societies such as Turkey share the same views on gender equality and sexual liberalization as other new democracies.
Even in established democracies, changes in cultural attitudes-and eventually, attitudes tions: "If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?"; "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women"; "A university education is more important for a boy than a girl"; "Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?"; and "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do." The scale was constructed so that if all respondents show high scores on all five items (representing strong support for gender equality), it pro-
